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The current study investigates the effect of task-irrelevant alcohol distractors on cognitive 
control and its interaction with heavy/light drinking in a group of young adult drinkers. It was 
hypothesised that alcohol distractors would result in a reduction of proactive control (reduced 
conflict adaptation) especially in heavy drinkers. 60 participants took part in a face-word 
version of the Stroop task preceded by an alcohol or neutral image. Light drinkers only 
showed a congruency effect which indicated a greater level of proactive control. Heavy 
drinkers showed a greater level of reactive control in which the conflict adaptation effect 
occurred with neutral images but not with alcohol images. Possible explanations are 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The current study investigates attentional control in young adult drinkers and how 
alcohol stimuli can affect attentional control. Previous research has focused on measuring 
how alcohol stimuli affect attentional control on single trials (Albery, Sharma, Noyce, Frings 
& Moss, 2015; Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006; Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001); the focus of 
the current study was to measure attentional control across multiple trials on a trial-by-trial 
basis.  
Previous research has established that alcohol-related stimuli can hold the attention of 
heavy social and problem drinkers (Cox et al., 2006; Fadardi & Cox, 2006; Field & Cox, 
2008; Lusher et al., 2004) as well as to hold attention long enough to affect subsequent trials 
(Clark, Sharma & Salter, 2015). Such carryover effects also occur with other addiction 
related stimuli (Sharma & Money, 2009; Waters et al., 2003; 2005) and negative emotional 
stimuli (Algom et al., 2004; Frings et al., 2010; McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 
2007).  Neurocognitive models of selective attention highlight that attentional control can be 
adapted as the environmental demands change. A dominant account of such contextual 
modulation of attentional control is the conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter & Cohen, 2001). This suggests that attentional control is engaged when conflicting 
information is detected, for example, when different streams of processing activate 
incompatible responses, such as incongruent trials in a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Conflict 
detection is thought to reduce the congruency effect (the difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials) by strengthening the task-relevant information. Thus the main prediction of 
this theory is that detecting conflict attenuates the congruency effect on subsequent trials (the 
conflict adaptation effect). This has been demonstrated using selective attention tasks such as 
the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004) and the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) where 
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previous incongruent trials (compared to previous congruent trials) attenuate the interference 
on the current trial. Imaging results have implicated central executive control mechanisms, in 
particular, the medial prefrontal and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices in conflict detection 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004) and the lateral prefrontal cortex in cognitive 
control (Egner & Hirsh, 2005).  
Executive control processes are also thought to be implicated in the attentional bias to 
alcohol stimuli, however, the central tenant of the conflict monitoring theory has not been 
tested in alcohol related research (see also Hotham, Sharma, & Hamilton-West, 2012). In 
particular how do alcohol-related stimuli affect cognitive control? Here we define cognitive 
control as the change in the trial-by-trial congruency effect that characterises the conflict 
adaptation effect (i.e. the attenuation of congruency effect on trials that follow incongruent 
than congruent trials). Padmala, Bauer and Pessoa (2011) have shown that prior irrelevant 
negative images can reduce the conflict adaptation effect on a face-word Stroop task. Our 
study followed closely the design used by Padmala et al., (2011) but used alcohol images 
rather than emotionally negative images. Theoretically it is suggested that motivationally 
salient stimuli reduce the resources available for top-down cognitive control. In the dual 
competition model Pessoa (2009) suggests a competition for limited executive control 
resources. This has been implemented in a connectionist model of adaptive attentional control 
by inhibition of the conflict detector (Wyble, Sharma & Bowman, 2008). More generally this 
describes a form of cognitive control referred to as reactive control (Braver, 2012). Reactive 
control emphasises the importance of recruiting attentional resources late in the selection 
process, after interference has occurred. This contrasts with proactive control that relies on 
attentional focus being set up in advance of the stimulus to inhibit automatic responses. 
We hypothesise that in a group of heavy drinkers alcohol-related images are 
particularly salient and therefore will also show a reduction in top-down cognitive control 
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demonstrated by a reduction in the conflict adaptation effect. We tested this in a group of 
undergraduate students, a group that is known for its drinking culture and hazardous drinking 
consumption (Gill, 2002; Heather et al., 2011; Davoren et al., 2015).  
2 Method 
2.1 Participants  
Sixty undergraduate students (50 female and 10 males; Mean Age=19.90 years, Age 
range 18-37 years) from the University of Kent volunteered to take part in the study for 
course credit. They gave informed written consent and the study was approved by the 
Psychology ethics committee at the University of Kent. All participants reported to be an 
alcohol consumer. 35 participants were classified as heavy drinkers (26 females) and 25 as 
light drinkers (24 females), see table 1. The two groups did not differ significantly in Age 
t(58)=1.34, p=.185). All participants were fluent English speakers. 
2.2  Materials  
There were a total of 72 alcohol and 72 neutral coloured images, obtained from 
Google images and matched to be similar in size, shape and complexity. Five students rated 
these stimuli for alcohol relatedness to establish the alcohol stimuli used were ‘alcohol-
related’ and the neutral stimuli were ‘not alcohol-related’. Alcohol images included drink 
related objects (e.g. alcohol bottles, beer cans, wine glass). Neutral images were of household 
objects, (e.g. kettle, pen, hair brush, bucket, candle). 
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT) 
Participants also completed a short questionnaire, the AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test; Saunders et al., 1993) consisting of ten questions. The AUDIT is a 
validated instrument that measures hazardous alcohol use (Lunin et al., 2015). 
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2.3  Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room with a computer. Participants 
first read the information sheet, signed the consent form and then completed the AUDIT 
questionnaire. Once completed, the researcher returned to the room to provide more detailed 
instructions about the computerised task. 
The study was programmed using Eprime, Version 2.10.  Each trial began with a 
white fixation cross for 500ms followed by a face-word image (see Figure 1). The face-word 
image was of a male or female face (all with neutral expressions) overlaid with the words 
(female, FEMALE, male, or MALE) taken from Padmala et al., (2011)1. Participants were 
asked to ignore the word and respond only to the gender of the face. The face-word remained 
on the screen until a response was made using the keyboard (right index finger: ‘m’ for male 
and left index finger: ‘z’ for female). Once a response was given the face-word disappeared, 
followed by a 200ms blank interval before an alcohol-related or neutral image was presented 
for 500ms. Participants were asked to ignore the alcohol or neutral image. 
Practice with the task (24 trials) was provided before the experimental trials. During 
practice (but not the experimental trials) a feedback (“correct”/”incorrect”) screen was 
displayed for 1000ms. A different set of stimuli were used during practice. The experimental 
trials (288 trials) consisted of six blocks of 48 trials. All conditions were randomly 
intermixed with the constraint that the trial order of each of the experimental conditions was 
(a) balanced in terms of previous and current trial congruency. (b) Half of the trials were 
preceded by a neutral image and half by an alcohol image. (c) The face or word did not 
physically match across successive trials to minimize priming effects (Mayr et al., 2003). As 
in Mayr et al., (2003) words were not alternated between the two genders but alternated in 
upper and lower case in successive trials. (d) On successive trials half the trials repeated and 
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half switched in response. The 72 male and 72 female faces were repeated once and shown 
once preceded by an incongruent trial and once preceded by a congruent trial.   
3. Results 
Prior to analysis of the response latencies, the first trial of each block, error trials, 
trials immediately following an error, and trials with an RT exceeding 2000ms and less than 
200ms were removed. 
A mixed design ANOVA was performed with Group (heavy, light drinker) as a 
between participant factor, and Image type (alcohol, neutral), Previous congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) and Current congruency (congruent, incongruent) as within 
participant factors. Mean correct reaction times was the dependent variable. As in previous 
research a Stroop effect (an effect of Current congruency: RT to incongruent trials are longer 
than to congruent trials) is expected as is a conflict adaptation effect (an interaction between 
Previous congruency and Current congruency indicating reduced congruency effects when 
the previous trial is incongruent than when congruent).  In addition it was hypothesised that 
the conflict adaptation effect would interact with Image type for heavy drinkers. 
The analysis of the response latencies revealed a significant main effect of Current 
congruency, F(1,58)=85.18, MSe=2433.55, p<.001 (one-tailed), =.59 and a Previous 
congruency x Current congruency interaction, F(1,58)=3.66, MSe=839.10, p=.03 (one-
tailed), =.06. In addition, we found that the conflict adaptation effect interacted with 
Group and Image Type as a significant 4-way interaction between Group x Image Type x 
Previous congruency x Current congruency, F(1,58)=4.38, MSe=1755.83, p=.041, =.07 
(see Figure 2). All other main and interaction effects were not significant (all F’s<2.06, 
p>.15). 
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Further analysis focused on the pattern of results within the two groups. Simple 
effects analysis indicated that for heavy drinkers the simple 3-way interaction between Image 
Type x Previous congruency x Current congruency was significant, F(1,34)=4.76, 
MSe=2063.67, p=.036, =.12  (See Figure 2). This was due to a significant Previous x 
Current congruency interaction for neutral images, F(1,34)=9.16, MSe=1280, p=.005, 
=.21, in which the current incongruent trial was faster when preceded by an incongruent 
trial than a congruent trial, p=.019 (this comparison was not significant for the current 
congruent trial, p=.08). The Previous x Current congruency interaction was not significant for 
alcohol images, F(1,34)=.47, MSe=1622.40, p=.496 =.01.  In contrast, for light drinkers 
the simple Image Type x Previous x Current congruency interaction was not significant, 
F(1,24)=.731, MSe=1319.72, p=.40,  =.03,  but there was a simple main effect of Current 
congruency, F(1,24)=33.38, MSe=2932.86, p<.001, =.58, that was not moderated by 
Previous congruency or Image Type (see Figure 2). Also, for light drinkers the simple 
Previous x Current congruency interaction for alcohol (F(1,24)=1.94, p=.176, = .075) and 
neutral (F(1,24)=.03, p=.859, =.001) images were not significant. 
Analysis of the error rates (mean proportion) showed main effects of Current and 
Previous congruency. However, these were subsumed within the Previous x Current 
congruency interaction, F(1,58)=9.89, MSe=.002, p=.003, =.15 These results are 
consistent with the conflict adaptation effect showing larger congruency effects in errors 
when the previous trial is congruent  (Mcongruent=.033, Mincongruent=.097), than when the 
previous trial is incongruent (Mcongruent=.035, Mincongruent=.074) . The Previous x Current 
congruency interaction was not moderated by Image Type (p=.627) or Group (p=.420) nor by 
an interaction with Image Type x Group (F(1,58)=1.06, MSe=.002, p=.307, =.02). There 
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was an interaction between Group and Image Type (Low_Neutral:.054; Low_Alcohol:.055, 
High_neutral=.071, High_Alcohol=.060). All other effects were not significant (F’s<2.81, 
p’s>.1). 
4. Discussion 
This research investigates whether alcohol saliency affects cognitive control 
mechanisms in a group of university students characterised as heavy drinkers (hazardous 
levels of alcohol consumption) or light drinkers (non-hazardous levels of alcohol 
consumption). The main finding was that for heavy drinkers conflict adaptation decreased 
when an irrelevant alcohol image (compared to a neutral image) was shown in between the 
two face-word conditions. In addition, light drinkers only showed a congruency effect with 
no conflict adaptation effect. These findings indicate that heavy drinkers are sensitive to the 
stimulus context, whether that context is previous congruency (incongruent/congruent) or 
previous alcohol saliency (alcohol/neutral), whereas the light drinkers were able to prevent 
this previous context from affecting their responses. This describes a general greater reliance 
on bottom-up information processing in the heavy drinkers compared to the light drinkers. 
The dual competition model (Pessoa, 2009) and the adaptive attentional control model 
(Wyble et al., 2008), which intends to explain an interaction between emotion and executive 
function, can be used to explain these results. These models propose that threatening stimuli 
divert attentional resources from executive control processes, in this case conflict detection in 
the Stroop task. By analogy, our results suggest that for heavy drinkers alcohol images 
compete for the same executive control processes that are activated by incongruent stimuli to 
reduce top-down cognitive control. This also suggests that a general slowing due to a 
carryover effect cannot explain these results as the slow down would have been equivalent 
for both subsequent incongruent and congruent trials.  More broadly, the findings highlight 
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that heavy drinkers behaviour can be characterised as a form of reactive control. These results 
are also consistent with a motivational account of attentional control. In particular that heavy 
drinkers may attribute threat to the alcohol images. There is much evidence to show that 
threatening stimuli can deplete attentional resources which in turn leads to a greater reliance 
on bottom-up processing (Eysenck et al., 2007). In the current study participants completed 
the AUDIT prior to taking part in the computerised task. It is therefore possible that filling 
out the AUDIT may have primed individuals possibly even increased their concerns over 
heavy drinking (Davies & Best, 1996). Future research will need to investigate whether the 
results reported here generalise to a situation where such priming is not activated.  
The pattern of results for light drinkers was different. Their response latencies were 
affected only by current congruency, indicating that light drinkers were able to filter out the 
previous context, whether the previous context was alcohol-related or congruency related. 
This pattern is consistent with a more proactive control of the previous context. It suggests 
that light drinkers may have greater attentional resources that enable them to reduce the 
impact of the previous context. The greater attentional resources may be related to the lower 
motivational significance of the alcohol stimuli. Although this may explain the insensitivity 
to the alcohol saliency it does not explain the insensitivity to the prior congruency. This is 
because if the alcohol images do not draw on additional executive control resources then 
conflict adaptation effects would still be expected because conflict (detecting that a trial is 
incongruent) is present under both neutral and alcohol conditions. One possibility for future 
research would be to explore the effects of mood as positive mood has been shown to reduce 
conflict adaptation effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2010; Schuch & Koch, 2015).  It is 
possible that the lack of conflict adaptation in light drinkers may have been because this 
group were in a more positive mood than the heavy drinkers.  
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The greater reliance on reactive control in heavy drinkers illustrates not only that 
alcohol-related cues can capture the attention of heavy drinkers but also that there are 
consequences for other cognitive processes that are involved in the balance between top-
down and bottom-up processing. The results also highlight the greater influence of the 
environmental context in heavy drinkers. Although heavy drinkers were exposed to alcohol-
related images it would be interesting to explore other types of environmental contexts, for 
example, what are the effects of working in a bar, do nonvisual cues (e.g. smell) have the 
same effects as visual cues, do different types of environmental contexts have different 
consequences for attentional bias to alcohol and cognitive control mechanisms? Interestingly, 
Albery et al., (2015) have shown that heavy drinkers’ attentional bias to alcohol stimuli was 
not affected by the level of exposure to working in a bar. However, in light drinkers the 
passive exposure to working in a bar increased the attentional bias to alcohol. Whether this 
passive form of exposure in light drinkers would have the same consequences for cognitive 
control processes as they do for heavy drinkers, where they are more actively engaged with 
alcohol stimuli, would be interesting to explore.  
There are a number of limitations to this study. The majority of the sample were 
females so it is possible that the results do not generalise to males. In addition the majority of 
the males were in the heavy drinking group. In a recent study Yarmush et al., (2016) showed 
that alcohol cravings were affected by an interaction between the exposure to alcohol cues 
and impulsivity in females but not in males. This suggests that males may be less sensitive to 
the exposure to alcohol cues and possibly therefore, the effects of the previous alcohol 
context on conflict adaptation may be diminished. This would also be consistent with female 
(compared to male) heavy drinkers interpreting the alcohol stimuli as more threatening.  A 
second limitation relates to the type of stimuli used. For example, previous work has 
indicated that using personalised stimuli in a group of social drinkers can increase alcohol-
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related attentional bias (Fridrici et al., 2013) and increase predictive validity for alcohol 
involvement (Christiansen & Bloor, 2014). It would therefore be interesting to see if the 
effects of alcohol cues reported here could be larger for personalised stimuli.  
In summary this research illustrates the important role played by reactive and 
proactive cognitive control mechanisms in drinkers. In particular it highlights the flexible 
nature with which executive functions can control automatic processes in heavy and light 
drinkers. 
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 Heavy drinkers Light drinkers 
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Figure 1. Shows two trials, an incongruent trial followed by an incongruent trial, with an alcohol image between them.  
 
Figure 2. Shows the response latencies for all conditions to illustrate conflict adaptation (previous x current congruency) changes with Group (heavy, light 
drinkers) and previous image type (alcohol, neutral). Errors bars show ±1 standard error. 
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